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Corporations and the Public Purpose:
Restoring the Balance
Charlie Cray1 and Lee Drutman2
In 2003, a new tobacco company called “Licensed to Kill, Inc.” was
incorporated in Virginia. The company’s purpose, as stated in its articles of
incorporation, was “the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products in a
way that each year kills over 400,000 Americans and 4.5 million other
persons worldwide.”3
Licensed to Kill was incorporated by anti-tobacco activists as a parody,
but it proved an important point: virtually anybody can incorporate a
business these days, even if the stated purpose of that business is to kill
millions of people. In a press release announcing the formation of the
company, Licensed to Kill Director Gary Vastone publicly thanked the
Virginia Corporation Commission for “granting us permission to exist. If a
person were to ask the state for authorization to go on a serial killing
rampage, he would surely be locked up in a jail or a mental institution.
Luckily, such moral standards do not apply to corporations.”4
By granting Licensed to Kill a charter of incorporation, the state
conferred a package of legal privileges on the company. The corporation
would be allowed to grow to unlimited size and scope, with an unlimited
lifespan, and its shareholders would be entitled to limited legal liability. In
exchange, the state would receive virtually no benefit beyond a modest
economic return. All Licensed to Kill had to do was file some paperwork
and pay a small fee of $130.
Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds are giant tobacco companies with track
records of selling deadly products to millions of consumers.5 They are large
companies incorporated by state governments.6 Their parent companies,
Altria and Reynolds American, are incorporated in Virginia and North
Carolina, respectively.7 These corporations continue to enjoy the privileges
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granted by their corporate charters in the face of evidence that they have
violated tobacco control laws around the world.8 Neither Virginia nor
Delaware has ever proposed revoking the charters of these corporations,
despite having the right and just cause to do so.9
Dozens of corporations responsible for major social, ecological, and
economic crimes continue to enjoy state-granted privileges, notwithstanding
long criminal records.10 If they were ordinary persons, many of these
corporations would probably be convicted and sentenced to long terms of
imprisonment. In some states, they might be executed.11 But corporations
are not ordinary persons. In fact, they are not persons at all.
What is a corporation? In essence, a corporation is one of many ways to
organize business, money, and property. It is a legal form, an abstraction
that gives incorporators rights and privileges they would not normally
enjoy. The corporate form allows numerous investors to pool capital into
one enterprise—the corporation—in exchange for ownership shares. The
owners set up a governance structure to do the business of the corporation,
and if the company makes money, they share in the profits.
There are millions of corporations of various kinds around the world.
The corporation of principal concern in this article is the large, limitedliability, publicly traded corporation because these corporations dominate
our economy, politics, and culture. The limited-liability corporation
dominates our entire society.
The ownership shares of limited-liability corporations are publicly traded
on open markets such as the New York Stock Exchange.12 Their investors
are responsible for debts and judgments against the corporation only up to
the value of their initial investment (limited shareholder liability). These
companies also have privileges under state laws, such as permission to grow
to unlimited size, to enjoy a perpetual life, and to own other companies.
Nearly every Fortune 500 company13 is a large, limited-liability, publicly
traded corporation.14 These corporations have virtually no inherent limits
on behavior and present virtually no risk of liability for their investors.
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Under the modern view of a corporation as merely a “nexus of contracts”
between private individuals, the common illusion that corporations are
primarily private entities with prerogatives beyond citizen control is now
accepted as fact.15 However, there is nothing inherent to the corporate form
that makes this inevitable. Rather, its status as a private entity is the result
of a long struggle in state and federal legislatures and courts. The American
business corporation evolved from a limited and tightly controlled franchise
incorporated to complete public improvement projects such as constructing
bridges, roads, and canals, and to provide certain services deemed essential
to a fledgling economy, such as banking and insurance,16 to a sprawling,
uncontrollable conglomerate over which the states relinquished their
mechanisms of control.
As a result, today we have a system in which large corporations are the
dominant institutions in our society. They maintain incredible power over
our lives and can cause devastating social, ecological, and financial harms.
And yet, despite their dominant position, they have very little accountability
to the public. As seen in the License to Kill example, today virtually no
public benefits or obligations are bargained for in exchange for the
advantages (e.g. limited liability) conferred through the corporate form, and
the obstacles to doing so, built into the law and political culture, are
significant. The ability of the people to use public institutions, including
governments, to control corporations is largely circumscribed. The question
becomes: how is it possible to restore public control over corporations?
This article argues that understanding the fundamentally public nature of
corporations is the key to restoring democratic control over them. If we
recognize that corporations are public institutions, created under a process
in which ultimate authority is vested in the citizens, then it becomes clear
that corporations do not intrinsically bear any rights or privileges except
those that citizens choose to confer on them.
In the first part of this article, we review some of the history of the
American corporation by drawing upon key judicial decisions, legislative
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history, and legal theory to trace how the corporation evolved from a public
entity to a private entity over time. We will see that the system of
regulation that we currently use to control corporations emerged after the
nineteenth century system of placing direct limits on corporations through
their charters had disappeared.
Next, we look at debates over the functions that specific corporations and
industrial sectors are supposed to perform in society, and whether the
broader public interest might be served in a different way. Debates over the
proper role of corporations have often centered around controversies over
privatization, corporate abuse of publicly owned assets, and “corporate
welfare.”17 We argue that an even broader debate over the nature and role
of corporations in society is possible—even necessary.
With this backdrop, we review a number of current industrial sectors and
examine the evidence for treating some corporations as public institutions.
In the absence of effective external regulation, it is worth resurrecting the
notion that corporations must fulfill certain obligations as part of their
“contract” with the society that grants them the privileges inherent in the
corporate form (e.g. limited liability). This is where our understanding of
corporations as public institutions can begin to translate into broader policy.
Federal chartering would be the most effective approach for industrial
sectors such as defense-related corporations where there is a clear national
interest at stake. Other approaches, such as community-controlled
corporations and non-corporate entities like community-based trusts may be
appropriate vehicles for the delivery of essential services and protection of
public assets.18
It will only be possible to achieve such policies if the public is informed
about past attempts to do so. Only an engaged citizenry, motivated to
reclaim its own authority to control corporations, can provide the kind of
impetus that policymakers and even legal theorists need to challenge
existing assumptions about a corporation’s status under the law.
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A HISTORY LESSON
Although it is possible to trace the roots of the modern corporation back
to Rome,19 a legal lineage that extends through medieval guilds and towns
and churches and universities, most histories of the modern multinational
corporation trace its origins to the big European trading companies. These
companies, such as the famous East India Company, were created by royal
charter or by special act of Parliament in the seventeenth century and were
privileged to explore, colonize, and trade in lands beyond the sea.20
The United States grew partly from the efforts of British colonial
companies chartered to grab the riches of the new worlds opened up by
Europe’s great explorers; both the East India Company and the Virginia
Company were chartered by the crown for the purposes of exploring the
New World and extracting its wealth and natural resources.21 The
companies simultaneously dumped indentured servants and other unwanted
people across the sea.22 These companies were different from modern
corporations in that they were quasi-governmental institutions chartered to
give members of the company exclusive trading privileges. Members
invested in “joint stock,” which at first represented only a subscription to a
specific voyage, but later evolved into a system of ownership in the
company for a period of time. If the enterprise was a success, joint stock
owners shared in the financial rewards in proportion to their investments.23
Although the British charter companies anticipated the modern corporate
structure, the simple structure of the early American economy meant that
there was little demand for corporate charters for local enterprise until about
1780.24 The giant trading companies of that day were chartered by the King
and functioned as extensions of his power. As a result, there was a general
distrust of big trading companies.25 The Boston Tea Party was the
signature event in an economic rebellion against the East India Company’s
attempt to monopolize American commodities markets. The Boston
merchants were rebelling against a British corporation and British crown
whose interests were intertwined.26
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After the Revolution, the Founding Fathers set upon the task of forming
a new government. They were faced with the question of what role
corporations should play in American society.27 But the memories of
exploitation by the large British trading companies made many early
American leaders wary of business forms that would confer special
privileges.28 In his famous treatise, The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith, an
economist and friend of some of America’s early leaders, was highly
critical of corporations for this very reason.
The pretense that corporations are necessary for the better
government of the trade is without any foundation. The real and
effectual discipline which is exercised over a workman, is not that
of his corporation, but that of his customers. It is the fear of losing
their employment which restrains his frauds and corrects his
negligence. An exclusive corporation necessarily weakens the
force of his discipline.29
Smith was opposed to corporations because he believed they interfered with
the “invisible hand” of the free market: “It is to prevent this reduction of
price, and consequently of wages and profit, by restraining that free
competition that would most certainly occasion it, that all corporations, and
the greater part of corporation laws, have been established.”30
The National Trades Union also opposed incorporation, predicting that
monopolies would ruin the individual enterprise and transform citizens into
“mere hewers of wood and drawers of water to jobbers, banks and
stockbrokers.”31 The resistance to corporations, therefore, was at the core
of the struggle between the new monopolists and the artisan class over the
meaning of “republicanism.”
Despite these concerns, many community leaders recognized the
corporation’s substantial potential for organizing civic and business affairs
in the new post-war society.32 Meanwhile, the laws that encouraged the
creation of local religious and secular education also helped to define the
laws that encouraged the development of business corporations; in their
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own ways, each of these types of organizations strongly contributed to the
public welfare.33 In addition, it was recognized that the new nation needed
infrastructure projects like turnpikes and canals, as well as banks and
insurance companies, to facilitate everyday commerce.
Through
corporations, individuals were able to pool together the funds necessary to
undertake projects and enterprises that presumably would benefit society as
a whole yet were too massive and risky for individuals to undertake alone.
Widespread public opposition to corporations led early legislatures to
grant few charters, and usually only after much debate, but corporations did
begin to proliferate by the end of the eighteenth century. In contrast to the
half-dozen American business charters granted in the entire colonial period,
147 were issued in the United States between 1781 and 1795.34 These
businesses were prohibited from taking any actions which the legislatures
that incorporated them did not sanction in their charter. When a corporation
caused harm to public interests or went beyond its mandate, its charter
could be revoked.35
Much of what we attempt to accomplish today through regulation was
accomplished in early America through the chartering process that defined a
corporation’s purpose. When a corporation violated its charter by operating
ultra vires, or outside the powers bestowed upon it, the corporation could be
dissolved by an act of the legislature that created it.36
The struggle to control corporations through their charters continued for
more than a century thereafter.37 Legislative debates over the creation of a
corporation reflected an understanding of the public nature of corporations
and established that the privileges bestowed by the people’s elected
representatives would be granted only in exchange for a broader public
benefit.38
To keep corporations under control, legislatures placed limits on them
through rules on capitalization, debt, land holdings, and profits. Some
states also limited corporate charters to a set number of years, forcing their
review and renewal when the charter expired. Unless a legislature renewed
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a charter, the corporation was dissolved and its assets divided among
shareholders.39 Legal rules limited the issuance of stock, clarified
shareholder voting rules, and determined procedures for record keeping and
disclosure of corporate information.40
As additional mechanisms of control, specific rules written into corporate
charters gave equal voting rights to large and small investors, outlawed
interlocking directorates, and limited capitalization and debts.41 Under the
ultra vires doctrine, corporations were prohibited from doing anything that
was not specifically authorized in their charters.42 Companies were
required to surrender their accounting books to the state legislature upon
request.43
In addition to protecting the public by limiting corporate power in their
charters, states enacted laws to protect vulnerable constituents, to protect
the public against various industry-specific abuses, and to impose personal
liability up to par value of the stock for shareholders who acquired stock at
a discount.44
In 1800, the vast majority of the 334 corporations that existed in the
United States were chartered to accomplish tasks that could rightly be
considered the public’s business. Sixty-five percent of these corporations
were involved in building turnpikes, bridges, and canals.45 Another 20
percent were involved in banking and insurance.46 Only eight corporations
were involved in manufacturing.47 Henry Carter Adams described
corporations as agencies of the state, saying: “They were created for the
purpose of enabling the public to realize some social or national end
without involving the necessity of direct government administration. They
were in reality arms of the state . . . .”48
We should not become too nostalgic for these early days of American
corporations. Because legislatures controlled the granting of corporate
charters, most of the charters went to politically well-connected and wealthy
individuals who became richer and more influential though their
corporations.49 Many of these early corporations received monopoly rights
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as part of their charter and they pushed hard for other advantages that were
not always in the public’s interest, testing the government’s control over
corporate action.50
Early government Attorney General Roger B. Taney observed: “It is a
fixed principle of our political institutions to guard against the unnecessary
accumulation of power over persons and property in any hands. And no
hands are less worthy to be trusted with it than those of a moneyed
corporation.”51
Although it has been suggested that the opposition to corporations during
the early nineteenth century represents an agrarian failure to accept the
efficiencies of the corporate form, small businesses and skilled artisans
argued that corporations with their attendant privileges were too powerful.52
The situation was complicated by proposals to open up the chartering
process so that anyone could obtain a corporate charter, and thus to
eliminate the air of political privilege surrounding the process of
incorporation. Andrew Jackson promoted this solution, and “sprinkled holy
water on corporations, cleansing them of the legal status of monopoly and
sending them forth as the benevolent agencies of free competition.”53 The
hope was, in other words, to mitigate the problems created by the corporate
form through further incorporation.
The gradual shift from a system of corporate charters to the laws of
general incorporation did not immediately prevent states from restricting the
power of corporations in their charters. That would not come until later, as
corporations began to establish their independence in the courts and play
states against each other in a charter-mongering process that loosened
certain prohibitions and permitted the formation of giant corporate trusts at
the end of the nineteenth century.54 The Jacksonian economic legislation
eventually revealed a historical irony: it promoted the very ends it was
intended to defeat.55
In 1819, the Supreme Court struck a blow to state control over
corporations by holding that New Hampshire’s attempt to turn Dartmouth
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College, a private college chartered by the King of England in 1769, into a
public institution was a constitutionally impermissible impairment of “the
obligation of contracts.”56 This ruling was an instrumental shift in the
relationship between corporations and the states that created them.
“The [Dartmouth] . . . decision expanded the privileges of private
property against the claims of the public interest, and it helped unleash
capitalist enterprise in nineteenth century America,” intellectual historian
Louis Menand suggests.57 It was a first step in defining the corporation as
an entity beyond citizen control.
In response, many states began to assert tighter public control by giving
themselves constitutional powers to revoke or alter charters.58

THE CORPORATE CHARTER RACE TO THE BOTTOM
As the nineteenth century progressed, the economy changed.
Agrarianism gave way to industrialization. People left the countryside for
the cities. In an age of railroads and steel, of oil and manufacturing,
corporations became powerful and, increasingly, national institutions. And
as corporate lawyers evaded existing limits on the size and scope of
corporations by forming holding companies and trusts, state corporate law
was about to hit a crisis point.
Beginning in 1891, New Jersey enacted a series of laws that effectively
relinquished its ability to regulate and control corporations through charters.
First, New Jersey became the first state to allow corporations to buy and sell
stock or property in other corporations and issue their own stock as
payment, creating “holding companies” that were crucial to the functioning
of trusts.59 Next, the state repealed its antitrust law in 1892.60 Lastly, in
1896, the state enacted its General Revision Act, an embarrassingly
permissive law that removed the fifty-year limit on corporate charters,
allowed corporations to conduct business in any state or foreign country,
and revised capitalization requirements to pave the way for massive
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concentration.61 It also permitted companies to issue nonvoting stock,
which enabled certain owners to raise capital while retaining control of a
corporation with ease and permitted directors to amend bylaws without the
consent of the shareholders.62
As a result of the General Revision Act, a stampede of large companies
reincorporated in New Jersey. By 1900, 95 percent of the nation’s major
corporations were chartered in New Jersey.63 New Jersey reaped the
intended financial rewards from this sale of its own sovereignty.64 The cost
to society, however, was dramatic. Some companies that reincorporated in
New Jersey did so to escape attempts by other states states at enforcing
public accountability. For instance, at the time of reincorporation in 1898,
the Standard Oil Company of the famed oil baron, John D. Rockefeller,
faced a contempt action in Ohio for refusing an Ohio Supreme Court order
to dissolve the Standard Oil Trust, a network of companies under one board
of directors that controlled 95 percent of all refined oil shipments by the
1880’s.65 Without any means of enforcement, the Court’s finding that the
trust was void as against public policy was rendered meaningless.66
Because the vast majority of corporations flocked to incorporate in New
Jersey, New Jersey’s law became the nation’s law, creating the legal
opportunities for massive consolidation and combination into giant
industrial trusts. In less than a decade, the corporate law of one state would
thoroughly transform the United States economy “from a reasonably
competitive to an oligopolistic structure,” in which 328 consolidated
corporations controlled roughly two-fifths of the country’s manufacturing
capital by 1904.67 Between 1898 and 1902, a total of 2,653 large firms
disappeared in a wave of merger mania.68
Though other states initially expressed outrage at New Jersey’s changes,
when they realized they could not force it to reverse the changes, many of
them followed New Jersey’s example, removing almost all restrictions in
corporate charters and doing away with the idea that corporations should be
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held directly accountable to the public and should be reasonably constrained
in their quest to pursue private profits.69
When New Jersey finally attempted to revoke some of the privileges of
its corporations in 1913 to stop the decline it had caused, it was already too
late. Many companies simply moved to Delaware, which in 1899 had
adopted an even more permissive law than New Jersey—and offered even
lower fees to incorporate.70 Delaware’s 1899 Act allowed incorporators to
insert any provisions they wanted into the charter regulating the
corporation, its directors, and its stockholders.71
Today, more than 308,000 companies, including 296 (59.2 percent) of the
Fortune 500 largest corporations in the United States, are incorporated in
Delaware, which is widely acknowledged as having the most managementfriendly statutes of any state.72 Delaware law gives executives the most
liberal control over the company. As a result, the corporate law of
Delaware has effectively become the national corporate law for the past one
hundred years.

THE RISE OF LIMITED LIABILITY
Besides reducing their own ability to hold corporations directly
accountable, states also fostered increased irresponsibility in the corporate
form through a widespread shift to limited liability for investors. Limited
liability meant that corporate investors were responsible for only their initial
investment in the company. If a company went into debt, investors might
lose what they had invested, but the creditors or unpaid employees could
not go after the investors’ personal assets.
Limited liability corporations had been granted in Britain to investors in
the East India Company and other business ventures, and was made
universally available there in 1855.73 In the U.S., the acceptance of limited
liability occurred only gradually over the course of the nineteenth century,
through fits and starts, as it was often the source of raucous debate in state
legislatures.74 Nevertheless, by the end of the century, as corporations
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became larger and ownership grew increasingly diffuse, limited liability
became a common feature, and became an embedded feature of the modern
corporation as the system of general incorporation gradually replaced
individual chartering.75
Limited liability was justified as necessary to generate investment
because it reduced risks.
However, it also encouraged corporate
irresponsibility by removing owners from the consequences of their
investments. As legal scholar William W. Cook wrote in 1891, “[t]here is
nothing in the corporate form itself to justify [the exaggerated application of
limited liability]. This pernicious movement has decreased the personal
responsibility on which the integrity of democratic institutions depends, and
has introduced into both investments and social services a dangerous
element of insecurity.”76
Limited liability also contributed to the separation of ownership and
control.77 By shifting risks from the corporation and its investors onto
society as a whole, the law changed the nature of the corporation. In short,
these changes made the corporation much harder to control, less responsible
by design, and hence, less responsive to the public.

THE RISE OF CORPORATE RIGHTS
In addition to limited liability and the shift in the incorporation process,
another key development in the nineteenth century lent considerable power
to the corporation’s claim as a private institution independent of public
control. Primarily as a result of judicial action, corporations increasingly
acquired constitutional rights.78
This process was connected to the emergence of theories of the
corporation as a private entity. That is, at the same time that the chartering
process was replaced by general incorporation laws, the “concession”
theory of corporations as artificial legal forms created by acts of the state
was replaced by a theory of corporations as “natural entities” and “rightsbearing entities” or “legal persons.”79
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Corporations were already recognized as possessing a personality
separate from the individuals composing it by 1886 when the Supreme
Court rendered its decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad.80 This case marked the first time the Supreme Court recognized
corporate personhood as conferring constitutional rights.81
In establishing the doctrine of “corporate personhood,” the Santa Clara
court provided corporations with a potentially powerful new shield against
public accountability.82 Boston University Professor of Sociology and
Political Science Alan Wolfe suggests that “[i]f we believe that corporations
are private agents, they are free to mind their own business outside the
purview of the rest of society.”83 Moreover, private corporations are rightsbearing creatures protected by the Constitution as individuals. Most
significantly, they enjoy the constitutional right to freedom of speech. “If,
on the other hand, corporations are understood as public actors, all these
conclusions are reversed. Corporations would have obligations not only to
their shareholders, but also to others in the society as well . . . .”84
TWENTIETH CENTURY ATTEMPTS AT CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY
With the spread of general incorporation, and the conferral of
constitutional rights on corporations, questions about how to maintain
control over corporations began to shift away from the corporate chartering
process, and instead toward government regulation and internal corporate
governance.85
Regulatory laws were not initially meek or modest, but corporations
gradually took control of the federal regulatory agencies charged with
enforcing those regulations—with predictable consequences.
Two
corporate accountability experts dryly regarded this capture of the new and
purportedly robust external regulation scheme as “[t]he ultimate commercial
accomplishment.”86
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Meanwhile, corporate law and theory began to center around debates
over corporate “citizenship” and the public duties of corporate directors and
officers. This debate, which continues today, primarily centers around three
main theories that have gained the most traction. The first theory is the
corporation as a separate entity. Proponents argue that, as its own entity,
the corporation has a duty to be a “good citizen” and to make decisions in
the public interest, even above the objections of shareholders.87
The second theory to gain traction is the idea that a corporation does the
most public good by maximizing shareholder wealth. This theory gained
popularity because it allowed corporate lawyers to develop seemingly
legitimate public policy around the idea that corporations owed no duty
outside of its own shareholders.88
The third theory is the “nexus of contracts” theory, in which the
corporation was seen as a system of market-style bargains negotiated
among various “stakeholders” who have different relationships to the
corporation. This theory, which became a dominant conception of the
corporation in the second half of the twentieth century, diminished the
public nature of the corporation and reduced the state to protecting and
enforcing contracts made by private parties.89

CHARTERING A NEW COURSE
Today we have lost touch with the chartering process that creates
corporations. We must once again take the incorporation process seriously
and recognize that incorporation is a privilege that the public offers to
private investors, and the public ought to get something back in return. This
is the foundation upon which any serious attempt to establish legal control
of corporations should be built. Every corporation—whether it is WalMart, ExxonMobil, General Motors, or Halliburton90—exists because a
state or federal government granted it a charter in exchange for a promise to
obey the law.
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Under the current paradigm of federal regulation, we rarely think about
how we could place direct limits on corporations through their charters. As
the License to Kill example illustrates, incorporation today is a routine,
bureaucratic process. States ask little in return for giving incorporators
legal privileges associated with the corporate form. States can reassert
control over corporations by creating real threats to revoke charters. Every
state has a statute that provides for the revocation of corporate charters.91
This authority, exercised pursuant to a legal procedure known as quo
warranto, remains woefully underused.92 Even corporations that engage in
repeated criminal activities are rarely threatened with charter revocation.
While all states retain the power to revoke, political pressure exerted by
large corporations usually prohibits state legislatures and attorneys general
from effecting corporate control through charter revocation.93
In 1998, a group of thirty citizens’ organizations and individuals asked
the state of California to exercise this authority. With the help of Loyola
Law School professor Robert Benson, the group filed a 127-page petition
asking the California attorney general to revoke the charter of Union Oil
Company of California (Unocal), based on its many environmental
violations and its complicity in “unspeakable” human rights violations, such
as its work with brutal governments in Afghanistan and Burma.94
As the petition explained, courts have consistently held that certain acts
of wrongdoing clearly warrant charter revocation. Judges have upheld
revocation as a remedy for “misuse” or “nonuse” of the corporate charter,
“unlawful acts,” “fraud,” “willful abuse of chartered privileges,”
“usurpation of powers,” “improper neglect of responsibility,” “excess of
power,” “mistake in the exercise of an acknowledged power” and “failure to
fulfill design and purpose.”95
Corporations have been held dissolvable for failing to lay railroad tracks
by a date promised, joining other companies to monopolize sugar,
conducting fraudulent real estate practices, putting out false advertising,
serving polluted water to customers, running baseball games on Sundays,
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paying members of the President’s family excessive salaries, self-dealing,
and for the apparent complicity of failing to remove the Corporate President
after four convictions in one year for illegally selling alcohol.96
California Attorney General Dan Lungren rejected the petition to revoke
Unocal’s charter three days later in a three-sentence letter, declining to
act.97 Professor Benson’s description of the event illustrates the absurdity
of Lungren’s response:
Lungren’s office went into a comical panic when it got wind of the
petition. His department called the California Highway Patrol the
night before the coalition’s press conference at the state office
building in Los Angeles and had the CHP warn the group not to
appear because a permit was needed to have a press conference on
state property. Lungren’s spokeswoman told the press first that the
attorney general had no authority to revoke corporate charters;
then—oops!—reversed herself hours later and said the department
would take several months to study it. Three business days later,
the refusal letter went out.98
Though the petition failed, in 2003 the petition filers regrouped and
worked to introduce a Corporate Three Strikes bill in the California State
Senate. As drafted, the bill would require the state attorney general to
revoke the charter of any corporation that is convicted of three “major
felonies,” defined as those that resulted in human death or incurred a fine of
$1 million or more, within a ten-year period.99 Additionally, the attorney
general would revoke the right to conduct business in the state from those
corporate felons not subject to charter revocation by the California
government.100 The law also would have required corporations to take out a
full-page ad in the state’s leading newspapers to publicize their crimes.101
Predictably, the bill met stiff resistance in committee, where it failed to
get the support of two key Democrats. The critics’ main concern was that a
third-strike conviction would be disastrous for workers and shareholders.
However, the bill contained a provision allowing the courts to appoint a
receiver to take over and manage the affairs of the corporation “as justice
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and equity require . . . and shall issue orders necessary to ensure that jobs
and wages are not lost, to protect community interests and legitimate
investor interests, and to maintain the entity’s obligations to protect the
health, safety, and environment of workers and the public.”102
Although the three strikes bill failed to pass, the proposal to use the same
receivership process commonly applied to corrupt unions or bankrupt
corporations is a potentially effective way to take into account any existing
claims upon the corporation. Receivership can also be leverage by which to
require companies to restructure themselves and eradicate the source of
lawbreaking behavior in order to be allowed to continue to conduct business
in the future. An example of how receivership might work in this capacity
is the New York District bankruptcy court’s appointment of former
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) commissioner Richard
Breeden as a corporate monitor in the case of WorldCom.103 Breeden’s
report on WorldCom set out corporate governance changes with which the
court required MCI (WorldCom’s successor) to comply in order to emerge
from bankruptcy. It established important precedents, including a cap on
CEO pay.104 Although Breeden’s recommendations were relatively modest,
a similar process could be used to force a corrupt business to restructure or
make other internal reforms in order to make it more accountable to the
public under a new charter.
Numerous law enforcement officials have recognized revocation of a
corporation’s charter as an appropriate sanction for corporate crime.
Revocation of a charter is particularly useful when the criminal behavior
cannot be isolated to a few individuals. A 1979 Department of Justice
(DOJ) report on corporate crime describes an approach similar to that used
when organizations are placed into receivership: recidivist corporations
with criminogenic cultures could be placed on a kind of probationary status
under the direction of directiors appointed by a court (as was the case with
Worldcom) or even a federal corporations commission.105 The DOJ report
recommends that directors representing certain external, public interests be
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empowered to recommend internal reforms, including invasive structural
reforms targeted towards eliminating the source of repeat lawbreaking
activities.106 The reforms chosen could include forbidding a corporation to
engage in particular lines of business or commerce, or barring it from doing
business in a geographical area or in a specific product line.107
The recent wave of corporate scandals can be viewed as largely the result
of an aggressive effort to deregulate certain industrial sectors—banking
(repeal of the Glass-Stegall Act, which separated commercial and
investment banking), telecommunications (Telecommunications Act of
1996, loosening controls on media and spectrum technology corporations),
and energy (the gradual gutting of the Public Utilities Holding Company
Act by SEC exemptions provided to Enron and other companies, as well as
proposals currently before Congress).108 All of these acts of deregulation
allowed for the formation of corporate conglomerates with intrinsic
conflicts of interest and anticompetitive structures. In the absence of
effective antitrust regulation,109 the use of structural reforms in corporate
charters could be an effective means of restraining vertical integration and
cross-industry ownership.110
Although state attorneys general have shown little interest in using
corporate charter revocation as a sanction on large corporations, they have
occasionally revoked charters of small corporations. The state of California
alone, for example, revoked the charters of 58,000 smaller corporations in
fiscal year 2001–2002 for failure to pay taxes or file proper statements.111
More substantially, in 2001, the Texas secretary of state revoked the
charter of Lionheart Newspapers Inc. (a publisher of more than seventy
publications) for nonpayment of franchise taxes.112 And in 1998, New York
Attorney General Dennis Vacco revoked the charters of two tobacco
industry front groups incorporated as nonprofits: The Council for Tobacco
Research and the Tobacco Institute Inc.113 Though the groups were
officially incorporated “to provide truthful information about the effects of
smoking on public health,” Vacco explained, “instead . . . these entities fed
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the public a pack of lies in an underhanded effort to promote smoking to
addict America’s kids.”114
There is some evidence that law enforcement officials are becoming
increasingly interested in using the charter revocation and re-chartering
options to combat corporate crime. When campaigning to replace Vacco in
1998, future New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer declared that “[w]hen
a corporation is convicted of repeated felonies that harm or endanger the
lives of human beings or destroy our environment, the corporation should
be put to death, its corporate existence ended, and its assets taken and sold
at public auction.”115 Spitzer is well known for progressive views of
corporate reform, and he is not alone. Referring to the powerful coal
industry’s abusive trucking practices, West Virginia Attorney General
Darrell McGraw said, “If a corporation uses its corporate charter to commit
an illegal act, then it’s our jurisdiction and our responsibility to do
something about it.”116
It has been suggested that the corporation’s status as a “person” under the
law entitles it to certain constitutional protections against charter
revocation.117 However, Professor Kent Greenfield has suggested that since
their charters provide that corporations are incorporated only for “lawful”
purposes, unlawful acts can be deemed ultra vires, or “beyond the power”
of the corporation.118 In such instances, corporations clearly violate the
heart of the corporate contract and become subject to the enforcement
powers of corporate law.119 While state officials in Delaware and elsewhere
might choose not to enforce the ultra vires doctrine for political or other
reasons, Greenfield suggests that shareholders could use it to enjoin the
corporation’s continuing unlawful acts.120
As Benson explains it, “[t]he people mistakenly assume that we have to
try to control these giant corporate repeat offenders one toxic spill at a time,
one layoff at a time, one human rights violation at a time. But the law has
always allowed the attorney general to go to court to simply dissolve a
corporation for wrongdoing and sell its assets to others who will operate in
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the public interest.”121 The failure of public officials to act accordingly
suggests that the public service aspect of the corporate form has atrophied.
However, it is still possible to reject the notion that the law gives
corporations an intrinsic right to exist in perpetuity without regard to their
behavior. Instead, a sovereign people, acting through their elected
government officials, create corporations and grant them privileges through
their charters. When corporations flout obligations to obey the law, and
become a danger to society, the governments that create them have the
right— and the means— to dismantle them.

USING CHARTERS AS BLUEPRINTS FOR PUBLIC
OBLIGATIONS
Another way to control corporations is by writing specific limits directly
into the charters. There is nothing prohibiting any state from placing limits
on how big corporations can grow to be, how long they can exist, or what
kind of liability investors should be exposed to. There is nothing inherent
in the corporation that requires it to enjoy the legal privileges it enjoys. If a
state wants to be serious about controlling corporations, it can change its
incorporation laws to ensure that limits are placed on corporate size, scope,
and behavior. Moreover, once a corporation is bound by such rules, it is not
free to break them.122
Revising the use of charters in this manner would send a strong message
that the state is serious about reasserting corporate obligations to serve
public interests and to enable citizen control over corporations. Of course,
without other changes of law, the only practical result of corporate law
reform might be to discourage any business from incorporating in the state.
Corporations can incorporate in any state they like, and the rules of
interstate commerce and their rights under the Constitution allow them to
protect themselves from states’ attempts to limit their behavior when they
are incorporated in another state. If one state decided to enact restrictive
corporate laws, most corporations would flee for friendlier legal grounds,
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just as many corporations fled to New Jersey during the charter-mongering
battles of the 1890s.123

THE PROBLEM OF STATE-BASED CORPORATE LAW
One of the oddities of our corporate law system is that although most of
our large corporations conduct business on national and international levels,
they continue to be chartered at the state level, and therefore state laws
primarily supply the rules that control their existence and governance. A
state-based system of corporate law made sense two hundred years ago
when state economies were much more distinct and corporations generally
operated within a single state. But today, when corporations operate
anywhere in the world, such a chartering system seems woefully
anachronistic.
The consequence is that the state with laws most favorable to
incorporators attracts the vast majority of incorporation activity. As noted,
that state is Delaware, home to 308,000 corporations, including almost 60
percent of Fortune 500 companies, and recipient of $500 million a year in
incorporation fees (roughly 25 percent of the state’s total revenues).124 The
state with the second-highest number of Fortune 500 incorporations is New
York, with just twenty-five incorporations.125 The result is that one state
virtually sets the standards of corporate law for the entire country.
Delaware, “a pygmy among the fifty states, prescribes, interprets, and
indeed denigrates national corporation policy as an incentive to encourage
incorporation within its borders, thereby increasing its revenue.”126
Delaware offers the most pro-management statutes available, essentially
allowing incorporators to do whatever they would like as long as it is not
otherwise illegal.
This situation presents a troubling obstacle to holding corporations
democratically accountable through corporate law. If tiny Delaware
(population: 820,000) effectively sets the corporate law for the entire
nation, and in some cases, the world, more than 99 percent of Americans
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have essentially been cut out of deciding how corporations should be
governed.127 Law professor Daniel J. H. Greenwood has concluded:
“Citizens, acting through the political process as presently constituted, have
effectively no say in constituting corporate law. The law, and the
corporations formed under it, are rather products of a market that, by
historical accident, has freed itself from political control.”128
Under the Delaware system, corporate managers are entrusted with
stewardship of enormous concentrations of wealth and power—in many
instances both larger and more important in our daily lives than most
governmental units—with little supervision or answerability to the political
process. These autonomous power concentrations, in turn, are granted the
strikingly unusual right to choose the law that governs them, thus
guaranteeing that corporate law will continue to respect their independence
from the will of the people. In short, we have created institutions of major
importance and power and then set them on their way to do good or ill with
little control or influence by the citizens whom, ultimately, they should
serve.129
Corporations are subject to the environmental, labor, securities, and other
laws of each state in which they operate.130 Why should corporate
governance laws be any different? If state legislatures want to make sure
that employees or shareholders of corporations that operate primarily within
their state enjoy more rights than Delaware corporate law grants them, why
should they be prohibited from doing so? There is simply no good reason.
Yet Delaware effectively sets the corporate law of the nation and creates a
troubling obstacle for the ability of states to regulate and control
corporations that operate within their borders.
One way to deal with this problem would be for a state (say, for example,
New York) to challenge the ability of Delaware to set corporate governance
rules for corporations that operate primarily in New York. Professor Kent
Greenfield suggests that Delaware’s dominance is illegitimate “because its
ability to define the rules of corporate governance depends on the so-called
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‘internal affairs’ doctrine, which provides that the rules governing the
internal affairs of corporations (that is, the rules of corporate governance)
originate from the state in which the corporation is chartered.”131
According to Greenwood, the internal affairs doctrine was not originally
established under constitutional or statutory provisions of law, but only
under judicial tradition, though some statutes now embody the principle.132
In fact, during the 1980s and early 1990s—a period of big mergers and
acquisitions and plant closures—some states moved to change their
corporate laws to require the courts to reflect the interests of employees and
other stakeholders.133 As a result, in over half of the states directors are
now permitted to take stakeholder interest into account.134 Connecticut, for
example, requires boards to consider the interests of corporate stakeholders
when making major decisions.135 Meanwhile, a recent proposal has also
been made to further expand the duties of corporate directors to account for
the interests of communities, the environment, and other stakeholders.136
Greenfield argues that the state that has the greatest interest in regulating
the internal affairs of a corporation should determine the rules of corporate
governance.137 In practice, this means states would impose their own
corporate governance laws on corporations whose business is primarily
carried on within that state, regardless of where the corporation is
incorporated. When these laws come in conflict with Delaware law (as they
inevitably would), it would ultimately be up to a judge. By relaxing
constraints on the internal affairs doctrine, corporate law would become
more democratic.138

IS IT TIME TO REVIVE THE FEDERAL CHARTERING
OPTION?
Another way to solve the problem of conflicts in state corporate law
would be to establish a system of federal chartering for businesses that
operate in multiple states. Instead of a competition among states to enact
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the most pro-corporate laws, a federal chartering system could require a
consistent set of rules about internal corporate governance.
The push for a federal chartering system is not a new idea, despite how
little traction it has gained thus far among corporate-controlled political
debates. Proposals for federal corporate charter laws were included in the
1904 Democratic Platform, the 1908 Republican Platform, and the 1912
Democratic Platform.139 Between 1915 and 1932, at least eight bills related
to federal chartering were introduced in Congress.140 In the 1930s, populist
Senator Joseph O’Mahoney of Wyoming promoted the idea of “National
Charters for National Business.”141 In his statement to the Temporary
National Economic Committee (TNEC) at its closing session on March 11,
1941, O’Mahoney suggested that to ensure business responsibility it is
necessary to have “a national charter system for all national
corporations.”142
O’Mahoney’s proposal would have required corporations with assets in
excess of $100,000 to obtain a federal license to engage in interstate
business, forbade stock ownership by one corporation in another and the
diversification of a corporation’s business beyond the provisions of its
charter.143 O’Mahoney threatened corporations that violated child labor and
collective bargaining laws with the loss of their license to do interstate
business.144 His effort to control corporate power through federal chartering
was derailed by the gathering storm surrounding World War II, and the
TNEC that O’Mahoney convened to ask tough questions about corporate
excesses was largely forgotten.145
In 1976 the idea of federal chartering was again revived by Ralph Nader,
Mark Green, and Joel Seligman in Taming the Giant Corporation.146 They
proposed a federal law requiring national businesses with more than $250
million in annual sales or more than 10,000 employees to obtain a federal
charter.147 These charters would include requirements for full-time outside
directors, disclosures about workplace conditions, prohibitions against
monopoly concentration, and disclosure of lobbying activities and tax
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returns—all provisions designed to protect shareholders, employees,
consumers, taxpayers, and communities.148
“The problem is ultimately one of power,” they wrote. They posed this
question: How do we limit unaccountable power and ensure that corporate
executives who hold managerial power are the best possible managers?149
They proposed a system of federal chartering that requires corporations to
pay attention to a broad range of public concerns beyond profits.150
There are a handful of federally chartered companies today. Amtrak is
federally chartered, as are mortgage lenders Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae.151 Both of these lenders were created to operate in the Department of
Housing and Urban Development for the public purpose of increasing
homeownership.152 Fannie Mae’s amended charter directs it towards
purposes that would not normally be served by for-profit corporations. It
provides assistance to secondary markets for residential mortgages,
including activities related to mortgages on housing for low- and moderateincome families.153 Fannie Mae also provides home loans, including loans
for energy conservation and solar power systems, and collects data to
monitor discriminatory practices in the home mortgage industry.154

EVALUATING THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OPTION
As a policy matter, it makes sense to consider once again the federal
chartering process as a mechanism for containing corporate power and
effectuating important national corporate reform policies. A state-based
system of corporate law presents formidable obstacles to national reform. It
makes the use of the chartering process to increase accountability in
corporations difficult unless all fifty states were to adopt the same reform
simultaneously. Moreover, federal chartering is a useful mechanism for
effecting public health and other kinds of policies where specific industries
wield considerable influence.
Consider Big Tobacco, for example. Towards the end of his memoir, A
Question of Intent, David Kessler, the head of the Food and Drug
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Administration from 1990 to 1997, concludes that regulating the tobacco
industry in the traditional sense would not adequately achieve national
public health objectives:
My understanding of the industry’s power finally forced me to see
that, in the long term, the solution to the smoking problem rests
with the bottom line, prohibiting the tobacco companies from
continuing to profit from the sale of a deadly, addictive drug.
These profits are inevitably used to promote that same addictive
product and to generate more sales. If public health is to be the
centerpiece of tobacco control—if our goal is to halt this manmade
epidemic—the tobacco industry, as currently configured, needs to
be dismantled . . . . [T]he industry cannot be left to peacefully reap
billions of dollars in profits . . . .155
After attempting to regulate the tobacco industry for seven years, Kessler
concluded it was necessary to dismantle the industry in order to deal with
the public health menace it had created.156 He proposed forcing tobacco
companies to be spun off from their corporate parents, and called for
Congress to “charter a tightly regulated corporation, one from which no one
profits, to take over manufacturing and sales.”157
Kessler’s solution to the tobacco problem resonates with the argument we
make about federal corporate chartering. The public needs to exercise
control over corporations its laws have created. Corporations that
consistently harm the public should not have government charters that allow
them to continue to conduct business. Kessler’s ideas would help rein in
corporations that directly threaten our collective well-being. Tobacco has
been recognized as a public health threat for some time. The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention estimates that in addition to 440,000
premature deaths, smoking costs the nation $167 billion a year in health
care costs and lost productivity—well over seven dollars for each pack of
cigarettes purchased by consumers.158
Although Kessler’s tobacco proposal is unlikely to be introduced in
Congress anytime soon,159 it reminds us that that our ability to control
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corporations comes from a powerful starting point: We create corporations
and endow them with rights and privileges for one ultimate purpose—to
serve the public good. Upon this basic framework, much follows.
Kessler’s proposal to federalize and re-charter the tobacco industry stems
from the need for a strong national health policy with explicit consequences
for industrial practices. A similar approach could be used to control other
dangerous technologies. The chlorine industry, for example, is at the center
of the spread of certain persistent toxic pollutants (e.g., dioxin, PCBs,
pesticides, ozone-depleting chemicals, etc.) recognized to cause a wide
range of serious human health and environmental effects.160 Various
organizations including the American Public Health Association,161 the
U.S./Canadian International Joint Commission on the Great Lakes,162 and
environmental groups, have called for a planned phaseout of the industrial
production and use of chlorine-based chemicals—a class that includes
11,000 individual chemicals.163
In 1994, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed to study
the viability of a national strategy to “prohibit, substitute, or reduce” the use
of chlorine in four key industrial sectors (PVC, solvents, pulp bleaching,
and water treatment), but a powerful response from the Chlorine Chemistry
Council defeated the EPA’s proposal.164
Additional calls for the
elimination of chlorine-based chemicals were made in the Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,165 which has targeted a
“blackout” list of global pollutants of highest concern.166
A national public health strategy to phase out chlorine in order to protect
human health, the environment, and national security167 could be achieved
by a strategy similar to Kessler’s proposal for controlling Big Tobacco.
Under such a policy, corporations that produce and use chlorine would be
required to phase it out or separately re-charter their chlorine-based
production activities as part of a planned phaseout, providing a transition
that takes into account the interests of communities and workers.168
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In order to illustrate how federal chartering could provide greater public
control over corporations, this article will examine four “private” industries
that have tremendous influence on public policies important to the broader
society. First, we will look at the nation’s defense and security contracting
firms and the question of national security. Second, we will examine the
accounting industry and its failure to adequately meet the needs of the
investing public. Third, we will discuss broadcast media and its substantial
effect on community affairs. Finally, we will move beyond the federal
chartering model to examine certain essential services where local control is
a more suitable mode of public regulation.

FEDERAL CHARTERING AND NATIONAL SECURITY
It is hard to imagine an industrial sector better suited for federal
chartering than the nation’s defense and security contracting firms. The
existence of these firms is predicated upon federal policy goals with the
largest receiving major income streams through federal contracts. For
example, Lockheed Martin, the Pentagon’s number one primary contractor,
received $21.9 billion in 2003 from the Pentagon out of its total sales of $32
billion.169 Yet, even national defense corporations are chartered under state
law and they enjoy the same weaknesses of state control that benefit other
private corporations.
As private firms, the defense contractors are able to engage in lobbying,
make campaign contributions to key members of Congress, and engage in
other forms of influence-peddling in order to influence defense policy
planning and weapons systems expenditures.
Examples of private
contractors defining the government’s defense policy are rampant and
systemic. In the recent case of Halliburton in Iraq, for example, Bunnatine
Greenhouse, the senior contracting specialist with the Army Corps of
Engineers blew the whistle on Halliburton’s involvement in the contracting
process.170 “I can unequivocally state that the abuse related to contracts
awarded to KBR represents the most blatant and improper contract abuse I
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have witnessed during the [twenty year] course of my professional career
[in government contracting],” said Greenhouse.171
The problem extends far beyond Halliburton. The growth of private
military firms and corporate intelligence contractors in the past decade has
created additional profitmaking pressures on national security policymaking
processes.172 Interlocking relationships exist between the largest defense
contractors and the Pentagon—including corporate representation on key
defense planning boards, and the regular passage of Pentagon and industry
personnel through the proverbial “revolving door”—i.e., to the private
sector companies that they formerly oversaw.173 The result is a steady
stream of abusive contracting practices and a potentially dangerous
distortion of American national security objectives. As a New York Times
reporter describes the situation, “Lockheed has become more than just the
biggest corporate cog in what Dwight D. Eisenhower called the militaryindustrial complex. It is increasingly putting its stamp on the nation’s
military policies, too.”174
Another result of defense contractors’ influence over Congress and
defense policy boards is a long-term commitment to the development of
high-tech weapons systems that only specific contractors are able to
produce.175 These weapons systems arguably have little to do with
preventing acts of terrorism—one of the nation’s current greatest security
concerns.
Two decades after President Eisenhower alerted the nation to the perils of
maintaining a permanent “military-industrial complex,”176 John Kenneth
Galbraith suggested that it was time to recognize that big defense
companies like General Dynamics and Lockheed, which do all but a
fraction of their business with the government, are really public firms and
should be nationalized.177 “By no known definition of private enterprise
can these specialized firms or subsidiaries be classified as private
corporations,” Galbraith wrote.178 He noted that much of the fixed capital
of these firms is owned by the government and that as a highly-concentrated
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industry, the defense firms were effectively protected from competition.179
In 1968, 10 percent of defense contracts were subject to competitive
bidding and 60 percent went by negotiations to contractors which were the
only source of supply.180 There was no market between the firm and the
government. Instead, members of two public bureaucracies worked out
agreements for supplying weapons and other war technologies.181
“The process of converting the defense firms from de facto to de jure
public enterprises would not be especially complicated,” Galbraith
suggested, outlining a transition plan for doing so: If a company or
subsidiary exceeded a certain size and degree of specialization in the
weapons business, its common stock would be valued at market rates well
antedating the takeover, and the stock and the debt would be assumed by
the Treasury in exchange for Government bonds. Stockholders would thus
be protected from any loss resulting from the conversion of these firms. 182
Galbraith proposed that the new nonprofit companies directors would
could be designated by the Government.183
The greatest enthusiasm for Galbraith’s proposal came from individuals
associated with these defense firms who had witnessed fantastic waste and
misuse of the nation’s resources. Many liberal members of Congress, who
received campaign contributions from the defense sector, opposed the
idea.184
Converting the companies to publicly-controlled, nonprofit status would
introduce a key change: it would reduce the entities’ impetus for aggressive
lobbying and campaign contributions. Chartering the defense contractors at
the federal level would in effect allow Congress to ban such activities
outright, thereby controlling an industry that is now a driving force rather
than a servant of foreign policy objectives. As public firms, they would
certainly continue to participate in the policy fora designed to determine the
nation’s national security and defense technology needs, but the profitdriven impetus to control the process in order to best serve corporate
shareholders would be eliminated. Thus, by turning defense and security
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firms into full public corporations, we would replace the criteria by which
their performance is judged from quarterly earnings targets to criteria that is
more consistent with the national interest.

ACCOUNTING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The accounting industry185 is another industry whose failure to
adequately serve the public interest remains a significant problem. It, too,
creates an opportunity to introduce national policies that would place in the
public domain a function crucial to sustaining investor confidence in public
securities markets.
Accounting firms played an important role in Enron’s collapse into
bankruptcy and other recent financial accounting scandals by authorizing
financial reports that involved major forms of deception.186 The SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 provides for strong penalties for financial fraud,187 and
eliminates certain conflicts of interest created by the consulting work that
accounting firms conducted for their audit clients. But the act exempted tax
and other forms of consulting that continue to constitute a major part of the
accounting industry’s business.188 “Tax work requires you to be an advocate
for the client,” a critic of the loophole recently pointed out to the Financial
Times. “That is not compatible with audit work.”189 In addition, tax
consulting companies continue to engage in outside business dealings with
their directors and have high-ranking executives who formerly worked for
the accounting firm, which can compromise the objectivity of the
auditors.190
Columbia University Law School Professor John Coffee suggests that
auditors serve a necessary function as “gatekeepers” for corporations whose
assertions about their own financial health are inherently suspect.191 As
independent watchdogs, auditors scrutinize corporate financial statements
and certify their accuracy. Yet the accounting firms create conflicts of
interest that undermine their objectivity and prudence by accepting millions
of dollars worth of consulting contracts with the same clients to develop and
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implement the very procedures that they are later required to audit. Given
the financial rewards for complacency built into the system, it is difficult to
imagine how public confidence can be restored unless auditing functions
are established in a completely independent body accountable to the public.
The Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s conviction of Arthur
Andersen for its role in the Enron scandal, one of many accounting scandals
that ultimately led to its demise.192 However, the firm was a recidivistic
offender that suffered significant damage to its reputation for its role in
other accounting scandals, including Waste Management193 and Sunbeam194
before Enron, and MCI/WorldCom,195 Global Crossing,196 and Qwest,197
afterwards.198
Andersen is not alone in its failure to provide an objective check on
corporate financial reporting. All of the Big Four accounting firms199 have
been implicated in massive audit failures that cost investors billions of
dollars. The global Big Four accounting firm Deloitte & Touche, for
example, faces $10 billion in shareholder claims for its role in Parmalat, the
“Enron of Europe.”200 The firm also paid $50 million to settle Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) civil charges that it failed to prevent
massive fraud at Adelphia.201
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), another Big Four accounting firm, paid
$48 million in 2005 to end litigation related to Safety-Kleen, a payout
consistent with previous class-action settlements for its role in Raytheon
($50 million) and U-Haul International’s parent company Amerco Inc. ($50
million).202
Ernst & Young, a third Big Four firm, has also had major problems that
threaten its existence, including a $4.7 billion negligence claim by UKbased Equitable Life.203 In April 2004, the SEC barred the firm from taking
on new clients for six months and ordered it to take on an outside monitor to
overhaul its independence policies, described by the SEC as a “sham.”204
The SEC administrative law judge found the firm’s “day-to-day operations
were profit-driven and ignored considerations of auditor independence” by
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jointly marketing consulting and tax services with an audit client,
PeopleSoft Inc.205
KPMG, the last of the Big Four accounting firms, faces lawsuits for its
auditing role at Fannie Mae (widespread accounting manipulations forced
Fannie Mae to restate an estimated $9 billion in earning in 2005),206 Xerox
(KPMG paid $22.5 million to settle charges brought by the SEC, the largest
regulatory penalty paid by an auditor in history),207 and Gemstar-TV Guide
International, Inc. (it agreed to pay $10 million to Gemstar shareholders).208
KPMG admitted to criminal wrongdoing and agreed to pay $456 million in
fines, restitution and penalties as part of an agreement with the Justice
Department to defer prosecution of the firm in association with the
marketing of problematic tax shelters that cost the IRS $2.5 billion in
evaded taxes.209 KPMG had “firm-wide numerical goals for new tax idea
submissions” and pressured KPMG tax professionals to meet this goal,
according to one report.210
Regulators feel constrained to sanction the Big Four when it comes to
new evidence of unprofessional behavior. After Andersen, no one wants to
be blamed for causing another firm to collapse. Yet major accounting
scandals are a virtual certainty. The FBI predicts that “major white collar
crime will impact the U.S. economy over the next five years.”211 The
Bureau is currently investigating over 189 major corporate frauds, eighteen
of which involve losses exceeding $1 billion.212
The concentration of the accounting industry has raised concerns that the
collapse of another “Big Four” firm could cause “paralysis in financial
markets.”213 The Big Four audit 97 percent of all public companies in
America with sales over $250 million.214 Few industry observers believe
that any of the next-largest firms could handle the kind of giant, multinational accounts that the global accounting firms are equipped to
service.215 Moreover, in the event that only three big accounting firms
remained, it would be difficult for the client companies to juggle the
relationships necessary to comply with conflict of interest rules.
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It is not clear that the collapse of another big accounting firm can be
prevented given the emasculation of corporate crime enforcement and tort
reforms that extend beyond the already problematic ones passed in the
1990s.216 As it is, the Big Four accounting firms face an estimated $50
billion in outstanding claims, and have huge problems getting insurance,
particularly against unpredictable “catastrophic” risk.217 In 2005, the
industry implicitly acknowledged its perilous position when it signaled its
intent to introduce a legislative limit on auditors’ liability.218 The firms’
precarious position and continuing conflicts of interest provide a significant
basis for federalizing the auditing function.
Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) proposed this kind of approach to
financial auditing problems in early 2002, before Andersen collapsed and
Sarbanes-Oxley was completed. Kucinich’s bill would have created a
Federal Bureau of Audits responsible for auditing all publicly traded
corporations.219 “Americans rely on the FBI to protect them from criminals
and terrorists, the FBA (Federal Bureau of Audits) [would] protect
American stockholders from the silent crimes committed by corporate
criminals,” Kucinich suggested. “The Enron scandal suggests we need cops
who carry calculators instead of firearms!”220
Given the precarious state of the accounting industry, a conservative case
can be made that placing the auditing process under federal control is
necessary to preserve the country’s free-market system. We must recognize
that accounting fraud has calamitous consequences for the firms involved,
for millions of people who depend on the performance of the market for
their retirement security, and for the broader economy. In this respect,
confidence in corporate financial reporting is a question of national
economic security.

THE NEWS MEDIA DEBATE
Another sector of the U.S. economy that falls largely within the public
domain, but is dominated by the investor-driven interests of corporate
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conglomerates, is the broadcast news media. Broadcast corporations pay
nothing for using the public’s airwaves, the most valuable resource of the
information economy, with an estimated commercial value of over $750
billion.221 The United States Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting v.
FCC concluded that broadcasters who receive licenses to operate on the
public airwaves free of charge must serve the public interest.222 Given a
license to operate, they are granted the privilege of using scarce community
broadcast frequencies, and are therefore “obligated to give suitable time and
attention to matters of great public concern.”223
Under current FCC standards, corporate broadcasters are required to meet
minimal requirements as a condition of their local station licenses, but the
requirements are not very significant.
These requirements include
preparation of public reports on children’s programming and an assessment
of how they are serving their listening communities,224 providing
“reasonable access” to legally qualified political candidates as defined by
FCC rules and regulations,225 and providing closed-caption television
programming.226 In reality, most broadcasters air their scant community
messages in the “wee hours of the night,” when audiences are at their
lowest and it is impossible to sell commercial advertising.227 A 2003 survey
of local TV stations in six different markets determined that only 0.5
percent of programming covered local public affairs, despite the potential
value of “localism” in serving the public interest.228
In large part as a result of FCC policies to loosen ownership caps, the
ownership of broadcast media across the nation has been concentrated into
only a handful of huge media conglomerates such as Viacom, Time Warner,
Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, General Electric, and Disney.229
These corporations have an enormous impact on the information an average
American receives. A similar concentration of ownership has occurred in
radio. As a result of loosened ownership rules, Texas-based Clear Channel
has rapidly acquired over 1,200 U.S. stations in a few years and begun to
broadcast homogenized programming in cities and towns across the
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country.230 Media analysts link this concentrated corporate ownership of
the media to a decline in the dissemination of independent, communitybased political perspectives, with significant adverse consequences for
democratic discourse and community well-being.231 In Minot, North
Dakota, for example, where six radio stations are owned by Clear Channel,
it took over an hour for the police to disseminate emergency information
about a lethal spill of toxic chemicals because the local stations were
broadcasting content that originated 1,600 miles away.232
Across the political spectrum, and even within the broadcast industry,
critics blame media corporations for effectively preventing diverse access to
the airwaves and thus lowering news reporting standards. CNN founder
Ted Turner argued that had he started his career in broadcast ownership in
2003, when the FCC proposed to further loosen media ownership rules, he
would not have been able to launch CNN.233 Turner stated, “[l]arge media
companies are far more profit-focused and risk-averse. They sometimes
confuse short-term profits and long-term value.
They kill local
programming because it’s expensive, and they push national programming
because it’s cheap—even if it runs counter to local interests and community
values.”234
A growing media reform movement has developed a number of strategies
to reclaim the public’s airwaves, protect public broadcasting and hold news
corporations accountable to their public interest obligations. These
strategies include local challenges to broadcast license renewals, demands
for limits on commercial advertising, and establishment of free municipally
controlled wireless communication networks.235 These efforts seem to be
supported by the language of the U.S. Supreme Court. “It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a
private licensee.”236 Even within the FCC, some commissioners support
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broader license renewal obligations that force radio stations to take their
public interest obligations more seriously or lose their licenses.237
In addition to these reforms, a structural limit on news corporations’
ownership of media resources should be inscribed in their corporate
charters, and required as conditions for obtaining a public broadcast license.
Furthermore, portions of the broadcast spectrum should be declared offlimits to for-profit private corporations.

LOCALLY CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
So far, this article has largely focused on federal control as the most
desirable source of public authority over corporate activity. We have
described cases, such as defense, in which public interests would effectively
be protected by a system of federal chartering. In addition, we have
explored reasons to restructure specific industry sectors, such as tobacco
and auditing, in order to place a critical part of the industry under direct
public control at the federal level. We have also cited federal limits on
media corporations as a means of curbing their ability to crowd out
competing voices with a legitimate right to public expression. We now turn
to specific sectors of the economy where, in order to protect the public
interest, it will be more effective to re-envision the corporation through a
framework of local control.
Municipal control is most necessary with corporations that provide
essential services like electricity, water, and transportation to individual
communities because of the important function of these services and the
technologies associated with them. The social value of these entities is
measured by their responsiveness to the people they serve, rather than their
ability to benefit remote shareholders.
Moreover, their inherent
technological requirements and structural efficiencies make them “natural
monopolies.”238 Tyson Slocum, the research director of Public Citizen’s
Critical Mass Energy Project, describes how electricity generation and
distribution is one such monopoly:
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Unlike other industries in the American economy, it is very
difficult to foster competition in the electricity industry.
Electricity’s high overhead costs limit the number of players, since
it requires hundreds of millions to build or buy a power plant . . . .
Constraints on sitting power plants also inhibit competition
because plants must be near power lines and meet minimum public
health standards, since those using natural gas, oil or coal (as 70
percent of U.S. plants do) produce harmful emissions.239
In order to determine how the provision of essential services like
electricity and water can best serve the public interest, we cannot look
merely at what level of government should charter a corporation; we must
also look at whether a public or private institution is best suited to providing
such services. Municipally incorporated utilities, restricted to a specific
purpose and accountable to the local citizens, are arguably the best equipped
to provide continuous services to the broader population.
The 2000–2001 California electricity crises illustrates the difference
between municipally accountable services and shareholder-driven utility
companies that are free to gouge consumers in a deregulated environment.
The manipulation of California’s electricity markets cost ratepayers tens of
billions of dollars, but it did not affect cities such as Sacramento and Los
Angeles, which controlled their own utilities.240 These cities were not
subject to the predatory price-gouging and artificial shortages created by
Enron and other companies.
Across the country, 2,100 municipalities own their own utilities, and
there are an additional 900 energy cooperatives.241 In 1999, the Department
of Energy found that, on average, customers who owned their utilities paid
18 percent less than customers of investor-owned utilities.242 The New
Rules Project explains, “[b]ecause customer-owned utilities are democratic
and locally controlled, and service rather than profit oriented, we should
encourage their formation. In today’s topsy-turvy electricity world, states
should encourage the formation not only of customer-owned distribution
utilities, but public transmission utilities and generation utilities as well.”243
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Beyond the financial advantage of customer ownership, the technological
scale and fragmentation inherent in local control provides the additional
benefits of stability and environmental protection. As the big northeastern
blackout of August 2003 demonstrated, a nationally or regionally integrated
grid system is potentially vulnerable to a failure in one location.
Recognizing that vulnerability, beginning in the early 1980s, Pentagon
analysts and energy efficiency experts made the case that a decentralized
system of energy and electricity would improve our national security.244
Smaller, locally owned utilities rarely build giant power plants that are
costlier to the environment and prime targets for terrorist attacks.245
Additionally, municipal control facilitates the introduction of locally
appropriate and ecologically sustainable technologies.246
Past examples demonstrate that municipal services performed better
under public control than when privatized. According to historian Clifton
Hood, New York City’s subway system was first operated in 1904 by the
Interborough Rapid Transit Company and then in conjunction with the
Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company after 1913.247 Rising inflation after
World War I caused both companies to teeter in and out of bankruptcy, so
the city started its own subway network in 1933. The Independent Subway
System competed with the private lines, which delivered poor service, and
in 1940, the city created a unified, municipally run system.248
Firefighting is another example of a service that was once in the private
sector but is now traditionally maintained as a public service. Communities
that have experimented with the privatization of firefighting services have
reported disastrous results. In 1985, the Salem, Arkansas Fire Corporation
arrived at a fire and let the home burn because the owner had not paid the
$20 annual subscription fee.249 “Once we verified that there was no life in
danger, and no immediate danger to a [subscriber’s] property, then
according to our rules we had no choice but to back off,” explained the fire
corporation’s chief.250
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The experience with essential services suggests that tightened regulation
and federal chartering may not be the most effective means of providing
public benefits. Local, customer-owned services, managed either by
municipal governments or as independent utilities, are much more
responsive to the needs of their constituents than corporations, whose
principle allegiance is to another constituency—their shareholders. The
example of essential services suggests that for some sectors of the economy,
institutional approaches like these may be more appropriate.

CONCLUSION: FROM PRIVATE BACK TO PUBLIC
As Alan Wolfe once suggested,
If we believe that corporations are private agents, they are free to
mind their own business outside the purview of the rest of society.
. . . If, on the other hand, corporations are understood as public
actors, all these conclusions are reversed. Corporations have
obligations not only to their shareholders, but also to others in the
society as well; they have public duties. . . .251
The legacy of the corporation as a private entity beginning with
Dartmouth and continuing with the adoption of general incorporation laws
resulted in the loss of an important means of holding corporations
accountable to the public interest. Although “the idea persisted that the
state conferred the privileges of incorporation not simply for the private
benefit of the incorporators, but also to further the general welfare,”252 easy
access to incorporation significantly weakened the perspective that
corporations are entities with privileged legal status created by the state.253
The acquisition of certain constitutional rights and the dissemination of
key judicial doctrines and legal theories provided the corporation even
further independence from the state. The result is an assumption that the
state can no longer bargain on behalf of the public in exchange for the
advantages of incorporation—a major concession. The implications of this
concession are rarely raised in public debates over corporate accountability.
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In this article, we have invoked specific examples of corporations and
industries (e.g. media, defense, financial accounting, and community-based
services) that are commonly considered to be more public than private. But
ultimately, it is important to ask how private can any corporation be if it
exists by legal rights granted to it by a public charter?
Corporate law and theory have long been skewed in the direction of
treating corporations as private entities. As a result, citizens’ ability to
reclaim our fundamental authority to determine the role corporations should
play in society has been thoroughly undermined. It is as if we have been
colonized by the very institutions we granted the privilege to exist.254 Only
by showing how corporations are essentially public entities can we reassert
the authority of states, laws and ultimately, the sovereign rights of the
people to control corporations.
Rather than attempting to force corporate law to attend to these questions
immediately, we recognize that public opinion must change significantly
before it will be possible to achieve corporate law reforms. The arguments
to be made for conceptualizing the public nature of corporations are defined
not merely in corporate law, but are rooted in the broader culture. Debates
like the one here must occur in public forums before the impetus for
developing a framework of effective law reform can occur.
David Millon suggests that corporate law has never had an ambitious
social agenda.255 It is hard to imagine how it would come to have a social
orientation in the future. In fact, corporate law may be an impediment to
real corporate accountability. Policy debates surrounding existing theories
of the corporation tend to drag participants into a dynamic that
impoverishes democratic imagination.
Until citizens fully imagine ways to reassert our collective authority over
corporations, we will necessarily work within corporate-dominated political
and economic systems to raise questions about corporate power. We want
to know why there is no balance sheet that accounts for public subsidies to
corporations and the estimated $2.6 trillion in both legal and illegal costs
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that corporations cost the public each year.256 What exempts corporations
from this kind of corporate accounting?
From the beginning of their existence, corporations have had a public
dimension. Actually, the concept of corporations as private entities is more
artificial than the idea of public corporations. The theory of the private
corporation is the product of decades of advocacy by corporate lawyers,
judicial opinions and doctrines that favor corporate interests and legislation
dominated by corporate influence. By reclaiming a history of the
corporation we can begin to lay the foundation for legitimizing a new public
theory of corporations.
In the Dartmouth College case Justice Marshall wrote, “[t]he objects for
which a corporation is created are universally such as the government
wishes to promote. They are deemed beneficial to the country; and this
benefit constitutes the consideration, and in most cases, the sole
consideration of the grant [of corporate identity].”257
In another famous United States Supreme Court case, Charles River
Bridge,258 Chief Justice Taney insisted that the notion of corporate charters
as private contracts be rejected, and that corporations must benefit the
whole community: “[W]e must not forget, that the community also have
rights, and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on
their faithful preservation.”259
As Justices Byron White, William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall
noted in First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti:
Corporations are artificial entities created by law for the purpose of
furthering certain economic goals. In order to facilitate the
achievement of such ends, special rules relating to such matters as
limited liability, perpetual life, and the accumulation, distribution,
and taxation of assets are normally applied to them. States have
provided corporations with such attributes in order to increase their
economic viability and thus strengthen the economy generally. It
has long been recognized, however, that the special status of
corporations has placed them in a position to control vast amounts
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of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not only
the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral
process. . . . The State need not permit its own creation to consume
it.260
These Justices are correct about the nature of corporate power and the
threat it creates to democracy. The state should not stand back in the face of
pervasive corporate power and allow itself to be overpowered and
consumed. If we consistently remember that corporations are creatures of
the state and its laws, and that “We The People,” acting through our
democratic governments, have the power to control corporations, we will be
on the path toward restoring democracy.
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